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Abstract: Georgia’s “Law on Broadcasting” was passed in 2004 to provide, among other things, a 
legal framework for the transformation of the country’s state broadcaster into the public service 
media provider. The law itself has been praised internationally for its progressive nature and 
presented as an example for other post-Soviet countries to follow. A decade later, and after a 
number of amendments, it is no longer seen as effective in ensuring that public service 
broadcasting in Georgia provides the expected quality and range of services, or can be immune to 
political interference. Since its birth, GPB has suffered from continuous crises and scandals, and 
has never been a major player in the Georgian media. There have been several attempts involving 
international organisations and institutions to reform and improve GPB, to elevate its status and 
increase its market share, but none of them have succeeded. Most of those efforts have been 
supported by the European Commission and the OSCE, with participation from such media 
organisations as the BBC, which had run a series of training and monitoring programmes until 
2011. A comprehensive programme of editorial, managerial and structural reform at the Georgian 
broadcaster developed in 2011-12 was shelved ahead of parliamentary and presidential elections, 
and GPB has been in a state of semi-paralysis ever since. The article examines the state of public 
service broadcasting in Georgia and what could be done to improve it.  
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Introduction 
 
The establishment of public service broadcasting in transitional and developing 
countries continues to be seen as an important aspect of international efforts to 
bring democracy to their citizens and to engender civil society1. One of the latest 
institutional reiterations of its vital role for freedom of expression came from the 
OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media, Dunja Mijatović, in November 
                                                 
1 One of many instruments of supporting policies is Recommendation CM/Rec(2007)3 of the 
Council of Europe on the remit of public service media in the information society. The OSCE’s 
Office on the Freedom of the Media is widely considered a watchdog of public service media in 
Europe and the FSU, while the European Broadcasting Union promotes public service media values 
and facilitates state broadcasters transformation and integration with the PSB community.  
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2014. She stressed the special position of public service broadcasters in media 
space, by saying: “The unique feature of public service broadcasters is that they are 
controlled by the public, funded by the public and made for the public” (OSCE 
2014). But in the age of social media and citizen journalism, and in the context of 
digitised media convergence, this role is being increasingly questioned. Also, the 
performance record of many public service broadcasters set up after the end of the 
Cold War in the former Communist and post-Soviet countries has been often seen 
as either disappointing, or has fallen short of expectations.  
 
Following the transformation of state broadcasters into public service ones in a 
number of the former Warsaw Pact countries in the 1990s, the PSB “offensive” 
moved on to the former Soviet Union republics, spearheaded by the OSCE, and 
supported by European and international institutions. But it met with either 
significant resistance or reluctance in target countries, which has resulted in quite 
limited outcomes. While several governments embraced the concept to fulfil 
conditions of membership of international organisations, its implementation has 
had much to be desired.  
 
For instance in Azerbaijan, the country’s public service broadcaster functions side 
by side with the state one, and unsurprisingly, has a slim audience and a more 
modest position on the market than the rivals. Its independence is widely seen as 
symbolic. One of the key conditions for Azerbaijan’s membership of the Council of 
Europe had been the establishment of public service broadcasting, which was duly 
set up in 2005 with some international support. But soon afterwards Azerbaijan’s 
Public Television and Radio Company, ITV, was found lacking in many of the usual 
attributes associated with an independent, robust media organisation with a public 
service remit. In 2008, the OSCE provided funds to launch a capacity building 
programme after an assessment by BBC experts identified a number of areas in 
need of an editorial and institutional boost2.  
 
One of the most recent entrants to join the PSB club, Kyrgyzstan, is still struggling 
to understand the concepts and values behind the idea. It remains the only Central 
Asian state to introduce PSB, following renewed international pressure after the 
violent ousting of President Bakiyev in 2010. But Kyrgyzstan’s transformation 
from state to public broadcasting has been fraught with difficulties despite 
significant funds provided by the US government3. In 2012, The UK Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office provided some funding to promote the culture of public 
service broadcasting in Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, and BBC World Service 
Trust managed to conduct several seminars and roundtables in the former, but 
failed to make any inroads in the latter.  
 
                                                 
2 The assistance training and development project was funded by the Baku office of the OSCE and 
delivered by BBC World Service Trust between 2008 and 2010. For details see OSCE 2010.  
3 In 2012, Internews started implementing a USAID programme worth several million US dollars 
aimed at reforming the former state broadcaster, but there is very little public record of what it has 
achieved.  
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The recent passing of a new law on public service broadcasting in Ukraine has been 
a relatively muted affair eclipsed by the conflict in the east of the country. But it 
may also partly be because it had taken 10 years to struggle through parliament – a 
result of strong political resistance in a country with the media controlled almost 
exclusively by powerbrokers and oligarchs. Within that period, the OSCE and the 
Council of Europe had consistently funded media law experts and consultants in 
periodic projects to push it through the legislative stage. Several European Union 
governments – notably Denmark and Norway – have been funding projects aimed 
at media reforms, which included supporting PSB initiatives4. Ironically, Ukraine’s 
public service broadcasting was set up in 2013 as an online citizen initiative of a 
small group of disgruntled journalists practically without international funding 
and before the passing of the law on PSB. Western funds came about only later 
following the exacerbation of the conflict with Russia.  
 
Both Armenia and Moldova passed legislation on PSB in the last decade, but have 
barely moved beyond the legislative stage or institutional change. In Armenia, 
public radio and television have been set up as two separate entities, and the 
country is only now considering merging them – at least for news and current 
affairs output – into one entity. In Moldova, the public broadcaster is still under 
strong government control.  
 
Against this background, Georgia has been consistently presented as a success 
story and an example to follow in the region. After the Rose Revolution in 2004, 
the country’s parliament passed a new broadcasting law hailed as one of the best 
legal frameworks around, which laid a foundation for establishing the Georgian 
Public Broadcaster (Georgian Law on Broadcasting 2004). The legal framework 
was developed with funding and expertise from several Western sources and 
followed the best practice and established international standards. But a decade 
on, there are few reasons to celebrate GPB’s forthcoming anniversary. Under the 
former president, Mikhail Saakashvili, the public broadcaster was repeatedly 
accused of working to his administration’s agendas even though its news division 
was widely considered as more reliable and balanced than the commercial or 
opposition outlets (UNDP 2010: 11). Its audience share was low and its impact 
limited compared to commercial rivals. Following the parliamentary and 
presidential elections in 2012 and 2013 respectively – and the subsequent 
departure of Saakashvili and many of his supporters, GPB has again been 
subjected to political and economic pressures by the new administration. Rounds 
of dismissals at the top of the organisation’s management have been followed by 
litigation and reinstatements, and compounded by a protracted crisis within its 
governance structure5.  
 
                                                 
4 One of the latest such programmes is a four-year DANIDA-funded programme of media 
democratisation in seven EU Neighbourhood countries, including Ukraine and Turkey, 
implemented by NIRAS.  
5 For an overview of the problems at the top of the GPB management and in the governance 
structure, see Transparency International’s report 2013. 
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So, is there still a strong case for claiming that public service media are so central 
to protecting and promoting democracy and civic values? Has the advent of social 
media and citizen journalism combined with digitised media convergence changed 
the media landscape to the extent that the mission almost exclusively assigned to 
PSB is now being shared by others, or perhaps is being gradually taken over? 
 
 
Georgia: an Exception or the Rule? 
 
The Georgian example is a case study showing that the role of public service 
broadcasting should not be underestimated in the battle for democracy, freedom of 
expression, and – by extension – ought to be seen as indispensable for vibrant and 
participatory civil society also in the digital age. The majority of funding for media 
development in Georgia has come from the United States agencies, which 
gradually shifted their priorities from supporting mainstream media to new and 
alternative media, culminating in a multimillion dollar USAID-funded project, G-
Media, launched in 20106. Any support in the transformation of the Georgian state 
broadcaster into a public service one, and in its subsequent reform and 
development has been largely left to European institutions such as the European 
Union and the OSCE. The process has never attracted major external funding, or 
consistent assistance, with only several limited training and monitoring projects 
implemented in the last few years (for details, see the section on outside assistance 
to GPB below).  
The fact that the Americans have effectively stayed away from the public service 
media sphere in Georgia resulted in what appears to have been a tacit division of 
labour between them and the European institutions. With its focus on the Internet 
and alternative media, and barely a year after its launch, the G-Media project was 
reportedly finding it increasingly difficult to identify new potential beneficiaries, 
while the ailing GPB was starved of funds to conduct a comprehensive reform 
programme. Media market research at the time, however, demonstrated that 
television in Georgia remained the main, and for the majority of people, the only 
source of news and important information. According to surveys conducted by 
Caucasus Research and Resource Centres (CRRC) in 2011, almost 90% of the 
Georgian population relied on television – and television mainly – as a source of 
information. It is true that the Internet use for this purpose has recently doubled in 
urban centres, but it is estimated that it will take many years in Georgia for 
Internet news provision to compete with television. In rural areas, TV is often the 
only source, with many people across the social spectrum admitting in surveys that 
they no longer own a radio receiver at home. In 2010, only about one in every 
twenty-five households in Georgia was reported as having a radio set7 (Open 
Society Foundation 2012: 16). The Saakashvili years left a legacy of largely 
independent, but under-funded newspapers and magazines with relatively low 
                                                 
6 For an overview of the programme, see the IREX website http://www.irex.org/project/georgian-
media-enhance-democracy-informed-citizenry-and-accountability-g-media. 
7 This does not include car radios for which there are no reliable statistics. 
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circulations, and a politically contested broadcasting landscape with major TV 
stations either controlled or owned by the former president’s supporters until 2013 
(Transparency International 2009). Although in 2009 president Saakashvili 
boasted in a CNN interview about the pluralistic nature of Georgia’s television 
scene, the truth remained that out of nearly thirty nominally independent channels 
two dominated the scene – and both were widely considered to be the mouthpiece 
of the government. Both Rustavi 2 and Imedi are privately owned and licensed as 
private broadcasters, but under Saakashvili they were believed to be controlled and 
financed by his close political allies.  
Before parliamentary elections of 2012 which dislodged Saakashvili’s government, 
Rustavi 2 commanded about a third of all television audiences in Georgia, while 
Imedi came second with more than 20% of viewers. The first channel of the 
Georgian public broadcaster came third with anything between 4 and 8% of the 
overall audience8. The most prominent opposition channels, such as Maestro or 
Kavkasia, managed to attract even smaller audiences as a result of what was 
believed to be politically motivated market manipulation. It came through the tight 
control of television advertising, which was also managed by people associated 
with Saakashvili. As a result, advertising income of opposition channels was low, 
and they had to rely on political funding rather than market mechanisms. By 
contrast, Imedi and Rustavi 2 achieved relatively healthy income from advertising, 
which was being induced by political market distortion.  
 
Georgia’s public service broadcaster had never fitted well in that picture. There 
was little interest on the part of the administration to make it better or stronger 
because this would entail drawing viewers away from Imedi and Rustavi 2, and 
possibly reducing advertising income. Even though for most of the time under 
Saakashvili the Board of Governors of GPB was made up of people allied to the 
government, it still meant extra editorial scrutiny and potential public insight into 
any interventions or manipulation of output. It is no wonder therefore that keeping 
GPB as a marginal and largely unreformed outlet was actually in the interest of the 
presidential apparatus despite any public pronouncements to the contrary.  
 
In 2011, the European Union launched an initiative to fund a comprehensive 
programme of reforms and modernisation at GPB, building on previous training 
and development work with the Georgian broadcaster. That project never took 
place. Three years on, and several crises later, GPB remains in a state of deadlock 
(Civil Georgia 2014). It is a regrettable state of affairs, as television is the dominant 
medium in Georgia, while the Internet penetration remains relatively low outside 
Tbilisi and major cities. The new and alternative media are predominantly 
produced by educated urbanites, and consumed mostly by a younger minority. 
Civil society in Georgia still craves for objective, balanced and reliable news and 
current affairs provision, good educational programmes and quality entertainment 
on television. Complaints that commercial channels focus on low budget 
                                                 
8 The actual figures have always been contested in the context of not fully reliable measurement and 
monitoring in what is now seen as a heavily manipulated market.  
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entertainment programmes and are politically biased and manipulative are 
common9.  
 
The present paper examines reasons for the continuing poor condition of public 
service broadcasting in Georgia in its otherwise relatively pluralistic and vibrant 
media market. It analyses the research leading to the project proposal to reform 
GPB in 2012 which the European Union Delegation in Tbilisi was not able to 
launch and implement at the time in the tense pre-election political environment. 
Despite the passing of time and the change of government, the findings of that 
research remain for most part fully valid today. It is argued that in the context of 
recent political developments in Georgia following parliamentary and presidential 
elections there, GPB requires concerted intervention as a matter of urgency. 
 
The Premise 
 
The present deplorable condition of GPB can be seen as an illustration of the 
limited value of the approaches adopted by international organisations and 
agencies in transforming former Soviet Union countries’ state broadcasters into 
public service organisations. A lot of resources and efforts had been assigned to 
elaborating the necessary legal frameworks, and to making sure that respective 
new media laws passed through parliaments and became integrated into 
modernised regulatory and licensing systems. Similar attention was given to 
designing and developing governance systems and bodies, and ways and 
procedures of appointing them.  
But the belief that such legal and structural underpinning would be the best way of 
protecting the independence of newly formed public service broadcasters from 
political interference and ensuring freedom from other external pressures turned 
out to be largely misguided. The Georgian media law is considered to be among the 
most progressive in the region, and the Georgian Law on Broadcasting has been 
used as an example to follow in legislative initiatives to reform the media in such 
countries as Turkmenistan or Kyrgyzstan. The intricate and detailed system of 
selecting, approving and rotating members of the Board of Governors of GPB 
incorporated in the law has been subject to several amendments, including the 
latest reduction in their number. They were all voted through in Parliament and 
examined in judicial reviews, as well as debated within civil society10. But this has 
not prevented the government from manipulating and interfering with GPB – both 
during the Saakashvili presidency, and under the current administration.  
 
The extent of interference can be illustrated by the replacement of Giorgi 
Chanturia after the defeat of Saakashvili’s government in 2012 with Giorgi 
                                                 
9 See, for example, the controversy and a debate that followed it caused by an episode of an 
entertainment programme “Apartment 18” on GDS TV channel available on 
http://www.georgianews.ge/society/27806-the-bum-scandal.html. The offending footage can be 
viewed on https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c1X-5DDZUFY. 
10 The latest amendment was analysed in detail by Katrin Nyman Metcalf for the OSCE in March 
2013. 
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Baratashvili as GPB’s Director-General. Freshly appointed Baratashvili was 
dismissed by the Board of Governors in early 2013, reinstated later in the year as a 
result of legal action, only to be dismissed again by the Board later that year. In a 
parallel process, the law on the Board of Governors was amended again in 2013, 
reducing the number of members to nine from fifteen, but failing to ensure an 
orderly transition to the new structure. The amendment was introduced at the 
time of a Board membership crisis after several resignations, resulting first in a 
deadlocked body lacking a quorum, and then in creating two parallel structures in 
an attempt to bypass legal and constitutional problems arising from the changes11.  
This emphasis on the legal – or even perhaps legalistic – aspect of introducing 
public service broadcasting in post-Soviet countries has been to the detriment of 
the editorial, managerial and journalistic side of the transformation. The change 
has been largely controlled by consultants and experts with a law background, and 
quite understandably focused on legal and procedural matters. In the case of 
Georgia, this approach resulted in an intrinsic weakness of GPB as an editorial 
outlet, as a broadcaster to be accountable to its audience, and as a media 
organisation to be capable of competing in an open market.  
This weakness has been the main reason for the partial self-disablement of the 
organisation. It has preferred to spend external funding on technology, studio 
infrastructure and improvements of formats, but to steer away from substantive 
work in editorial and content areas, which requires a lot of long-term effort and is 
not easily measurable. The lack of journalistic and editorial professionalism, low 
skills base and inept managerial practices have rendered it vulnerable to political 
interference which the legal framework alone could not address. The continued 
deficiencies within GPB became subject of closer international attention in 2008, 
when opposition protests started to take place in front of the GPB main building, 
following the re-election of Mikhail Saakashvili. The demonstrators’ demands for 
balanced and objective news at the time of elections made the international 
community aware of how important the former state broadcaster was for the 
Georgian public life.  
 
Subsequently, several major international media organisations were called upon to 
examine the internal situation at GPB towards the end of 2008, resulting in needs 
assessment reports focusing on editorial and managerial aspects of its operation. 
They were followed by a series of assistance interventions of limited scope and 
duration, which appear to have had negligible impact on the organisation. 
 
Outside assistance to GPB 
 
International organisations and agencies have been quite actively involved in the 
development of the media in Georgia in the last decade, but relatively modest 
funds have been dedicated to the country’s public broadcaster. It is possible that 
after addressing the legal sphere related to broadcasting, an assumption was made 
                                                 
11 For an explanation of the convoluted process, see Transparency International’s 2014 report, p. 7. 
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that the bulk of the job had already been done. The Law on Broadcasting did not 
only provide the necessary regulatory framework for the functioning of GPB, but 
also guaranteed it a stable source of funding from the state budget unavailable to 
commercial outlets and media start-ups queuing for international donor money.  
 
The new broadcast law for Georgia was hailed as a huge success, but the intended 
big bang associated with transforming the state broadcaster into a public service 
one in 2005 never really happened. The re-branded company failed to capture the 
public’s viewing. Audience figures fell to the point of being negligible, until the war 
with Russia in August 2008, which briefly reversed the trend.12 At the invitation of 
the European Union, consultants from the BBC conducted a Needs Assessment 
mission in October 2008 in which they sounded a warning:  
  
“We do not want BBC trainers to come and remedy shortcomings at GPB only for us to find 
that the problem preventing the station from gaining public trust lies elsewhere, such as in 
a latent mechanism that allows outside forces to exert control. We explained that we have a 
duty to protect the BBC’s reputation. The BBC does not want to be accused of propping up 
an organisation that purports to uphold public broadcasting values but is in fact state 
broadcasting in disguise” (BBC World Service Trust 2008: 10).  
 
The subsequent series of training activities funded by the European Union and 
focusing on the editorial integrity and standards in news and current affairs at GPB 
was delivered by BBC World Service Trust experts until March 2010. The Head of 
News at GPB at the time, Khatuna Berdzenishvili, said that the training had had 
considerable impact on the news and current affairs output, and brought about an 
increase in audience figures.  
This was followed by another intervention involving UNDP and the BBC, again 
partly funded by the EU. The “Development of Media Monitoring capacities in 
Georgia” programme was aimed at building the capacity of GPB for professional 
media coverage. Its delivery started in April 2010 and came to an end in 2012.  
Between December 2009 and February 2010, experts from Canal France 
International visited Tbilisi twice to assess the institutional capacity of each of the 
three TV channels with emphasis on the 2nd channel and with the view to 
restructuring it into a parliamentary channel. Those two short-term missions 
resulted in more assessment reports but no concrete results.  
A number of international agencies have sponsored or provided funds for specific 
programmes or activities at GPB. The British Embassy funded training for GPB 
staff in the run-up to a launch of a political talk-show “Public Politics”. The Swiss 
Agency for development and Co-operation (SDC) funded a TV programme for 
farmers, and the Eurasia Partnership Foundation provided a grant to create and 
run a joint TV and radio project “European Time” on EU integration issues. 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation contributed financially to the production of the 
show.  
 
 
                                                 
12 According to figures supplied by AGB Nielsen Media Research in Georgia. 
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In 2011, GPB itself commissioned the European Broadcasting Union (EBU) to 
conduct a mission examining the structural and institutional health of GBP with 
the view to producing a strategy paper for the organisation for the following five 
years. It also included looking into such issues as the impact of digitisation on 
GPB, and the implications of the planned relocation to new premises. The project 
was funded by UNDP and the Swedish International Agency for Development 
(SIDA). The strategy document has been posted on the GPB website since 2012 
(GPB 2012). Apart from a short news item13 announcing further development and 
improvement of GPB in line with the EBU strategy nothing happened until late 
2014, when the EBU announced a repeat of the exercise from 2011-12. It is to be 
led by the same consultant to revise and update the strategy paper, which had 
never been acted upon in the first place14.  
 
There has been no comprehensive, longer-term assistance programme to the 
Georgian public broadcaster to date that would address problems contributing to 
the state it is in at present. Before the international community commissions yet 
prepares another strategy paper or needs assessment mission, it is worth re-
examining the findings and recommendations of the research conducted in late 
2011 for the European Union Delegation in Tbilisi. With several exceptions, mainly 
to do with the closure of the Russian language external satellite channel, PIK in 
2012, they still reflect quite accurately the state of affairs at GPB, and the steps that 
could be taken in order to empower the broadcaster to perform its role as 
envisaged in the legal founding document of 2004. 
 
 
The Needs Assessment Report of 2011 
 
The full version of the report completed in October 2011 and submitted to the EU 
Delegation in Tbilisi has not been published.15 Instead, a shorter version of the 
document, entitled ‘The Briefing Note’ was disseminated to international 
organisations, local NGOs and Georgian government departments and presented 
at roundtable meetings in the Georgian capital.16 The local media reported that the 
top management had agreed with most of the findings (Mchedlidze 2011). At that 
time, the planned reform of GPB was on the list of priorities of the Georgian 
government. Shortly after the dissemination of the findings and recommendations 
included in the Briefing Note, GPB modernisation disappeared from the 
governmental priority list. It automatically meant that the EU Commission 
Delegation in Tbilisi was not be able to dedicate over a million Euros previously 
                                                 
13 See TV post on http://www.gpb.ge/NewsView.aspx?Location=156&LangID=2. 
14 The measure announced in November 2014 at the 11th South Caucasus Media Conference in 
Tbilisi. 
15 The full text of the report is available online 
https://www.academia.edu/10173652/Georgian_Public_Service_Broadcaster_Needs_Assessment
_Report_2011 
16 The document is available online 
https://www.academia.edu/10173782/Georgian_Public_Broadcaster_Assessment_Report_Briefin
g_Note 
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earmarked for the reform programme and explicitly requested by the 
administration simply because Saakashvili’s government no longer saw it as a 
priority. One can only speculate why government policy changed so dramatically 
and at such short notice in an obvious turnaround. One possible explanation is 
that the government of the day needed to energise GPB with extra funding for a 
relatively short period before the parliamentary elections in the context of growing 
uncertainty about the outcome.17 The needs assessment report with its proposed 
reforms would have meant additional constraints rather than a boost to the 
government’s electoral campaign.  
 
The sections below present briefly the contents of the document with necessary 
amendments to take in the events and changes that have taken place at GPB and 
on the Georgian political stage since then. 
 
Public Service Broadcaster (GPB) – basic facts and figures 
 
Georgian Public Broadcasting (GPB) at present consists of two television channels 
and two radio stations, but is popularly identified with TV Channel 1. The 
generalist 1st Channel has traditionally lagged well behind its commercial rivals, 
Rustavi 2 and Imedi in terms of audience share, but has consistently scored as the 
third player in viewing ratings (Open Society Foundation 2012: 24). The 2nd GPB 
channel, increasingly referred to as the parliamentary channel, is still not fully 
developed and operational, and there are no firm decisions about its future shape 
or direction apart from periodic promises to transform it into a sustainable 
operation. GPB used to hold an external service Russian-language satellite TV 
channel under its umbrella until its closure in late 2012, which is discussed in a 
separate section below. The channel, known as PIK (based on its Russian-language 
acronym18) re-launched in 2010 in a presidential initiative to counterbalance the 
Russian media influence in the region in the aftermath of the Russian-Georgian 
war of August 2008.  
 
There are two GPB FM radio stations, with FM102.4 mirroring the generalist 
nature of TV 1st Channel, and the FM100.9 playing mostly music, and sometimes 
inserting some speech-based content. There are no available statistics on audience 
figures of any Georgian radio stations, including the public ones (Open Society 
Foundation 2012: 24). The on-line presence of GPB as an Internet media content 
provider is in its infancy, and does not feature highly in programme priorities.  
 
The output of both GPB radio and television channels is the usual mix of news, 
culture, history, education and entertainment found at many former Soviet state 
broadcasters transiting into open market environment. With its low budget 
compared to commercial rivals and the constraints imposed by its public service 
                                                 
17 The uncertainty in the Saakashvili camp was vastly exacerbated by the sudden and meteoric rise 
of Bidzina Ivanishvili on Georgia’s political scene in 2011.  
18 The full name in Russian was «Первый Информационный Кавказкий». 
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remit, GPB cannot compete in the area of entertainment or TV drama 
programming.  
 
In one of the legal amendments several years ago, GPB was additionally burdened 
with the obligation to cover – and pay for – major international sporting events 
and tournaments, including the costly World Cup. Commercial TV stations had 
previously experimented with broadcasting sport events, but repeatedly found it 
hard to attract enough associated advertising even to cover the cost, let alone make 
any money. But the Georgian audiences quite vocally demanded major sporting 
events on television, and GPB ended up with this loss-making remit further 
depleting its ability to commission or purchase any quality programmes. 
Consequently, a considerable part of the public broadcaster’s budget is spent on 
news and current affairs as part of its public service remit with little left for 
anything else. Despite several political talk shows, which periodically achieved 
good viewing ratings, many Georgians have repeatedly described the majority of 
programmes as boring or simply “unwatchable”.  
  
The image of GPB in the eyes of ordinary Georgians has repeatedly suffered from a 
series of events shortly after it was set up. The period of the state of emergency 
introduced by President Mikhail Saakashvili in November 2007, and his 
subsequent re-election as President in January 2008 reinforced negative 
perceptions. At that time, GPB was accused of failing to report important events 
related to the opposition parties. This was followed by a complete clean-out and 
replacement of the Board of Trustees and top management, and a re-launch of the 
1st channel. The political tension around GPB continued well into 2010, leading to 
legislative changes, deals with the opposition, an enlargement of the Board of 
Trustees by a few opposition personalities, and yet another change at the top. The 
cycle was repeated after the 2012 and 2013 elections, which witnessed another 
leadership crisis and more legal manoeuvring around the Board of Governors this 
time resulting in the reduction of the body’s membership.  
 
The Georgian public service broadcaster is funded from the state coffers by an 
annual allocation of 0.12% of the overall budget with a ring fencing proviso that 
any possible decreases in subsequent year budgets would not trigger a 
proportional decrease in the allocations compared to a previous year (Georgian 
Law on Broadcasting, Article 33, p. 21). The organisation is permitted by law to 
generate commercial income, although there are quite many limitations and 
conditions attached to such areas as advertising or sponsorship.  
 
As of 2011, GPB employed about 930 people at its two TV channels and the two 
radio stations. There is high fluctuation of the workforce, and salary levels are 
considered low. Only about 5% of staff is on continuing or permanent contracts – 
mostly people in senior positions – while the rest are employed on short-term 
contracts.  
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Legal and regulatory environment 
 
Broadcasting Law of 2004 
 
The functioning of GPB as a public service broadcaster is regulated by the 
Georgian Law on Broadcasting. It was adopted by the country’s Parliament in 
2004, with numerous subsequent amendments. Chapter III of the Law obliges 
GPB to fulfil its duties in the spirit of the legislation passed in many of the 
European Union states on public broadcasting. Among other things, it requires 
GPB:  
 
 To be editorially independent, fair and impartial 
 To be free from political, religious and commercial influence 
 To maintain programming balance in its scheduling to cover all types of 
content, including news and current affairs, politics, social issues, culture, 
art, educational and children’s programmes, sport and entertainment  
 To provide prompt and professional news coverage of events in Georgia, 
including regional news, and international news 
 To be pluralistic and unbiased, reflect multicultural and multi-ethnic nature 
of Georgian society, and to refrain from opining  
 To outsource at least one quarter of its output 
 To support and promote Georgian national, spiritual and cultural values 
and diversity 
 
The law specifies a grievance procedure available to GPB in cases of violations of 
its editorial independence by government or other interference. It includes referral 
to the country’s broadcasting commission, GNCC, or a court application. It names 
the Board of Trustees as the main governing and regulatory body inside the 
organisation, and defines its roles and responsibilities. It also names the Director 
General as the other management body, leaving the rest of the structure to be 
determined internally by GPB.  
The Broadcasting Law also establishes a broadcasting fee pegged to a taxpayer’s 
status as a legal form of funding for the Public Broadcaster, but within the same 
article it makes a provision which hibernates the enforcement of the broadcasting 
fee until an unspecified later date. In its place, the provision makes an allocation of 
0.12% of the previous year’s state budget as a source of funding for GPB.  
Among the articles applying to all broadcasters within the body of the law, there 
are paragraphs specifically referring to the public broadcaster, such as limitations 
in its commercial activities and in collecting advertising revenues. One of the latest 
amendments in this area is prohibition of all commercial advertising by the public 
broadcaster, with the exception of sports programmes. It appears to be an indirect 
measure aimed at ring-fencing the majority of advertising for the main commercial 
TV stations, and a limited consolation prize for GPB’s burden of covering major 
and expensive sporting events. 
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Code of Conduct for Broadcasters (2009) 
 
The Georgian National Communications Commission, GNCC, which among other 
things issues broadcast licenses, was required by law to pass a Code of Conduct for 
Broadcasters, setting in motion regulatory and self-regulatory mechanisms, and 
establishing complaints and appeals procedures. The Code was drafted with the 
help of experts from the Council of Europe and passed in 2009. It applies to all 
broadcasters in Georgia, including GPB.  
 
GPB Internal Codes of Conduct 
 
The Georgian Public Broadcaster has adopted its own, additional in-house code of 
conduct for staff journalists, editors and producers setting professional standards 
and principles of journalism ethics (GPB 2008). It is a comprehensive document, 
far more detailed than the Code of Conduct for Broadcasters. It was prepared with 
the assistance of BBC consultants, and drawing heavily on BBC Producers’ 
Guidelines.19 Its function is similar to that of the Associated Press Stylebook, and 
other internal manuals or reference handbooks issued by major media 
organisations.  
On top of the legislative, self-regulatory principles and codes summarised above, 
the News and Current Affairs unit of the GPB 1st Channel, Moambe, has elaborated 
its own guidelines, defining in more detail production and editorial procedures 
within the department. Moambe staff is required to follow all the above documents 
at work. 
 
 
Assessment of GPB 
 
In 2011, a visiting EBU representative summed up his view of GPB by saying that it 
was a shame that the transformation of the organisation from state broadcaster to 
a public service one in Georgia had only taken place on paper and not in reality.20 
At the time of the needs assessment research in late 2011, GPB was in the course of 
making yet more changes in its organisational chart. It is worth noting that not a 
single Director-General has ever served a full term at GPB since its inception, and 
the Broadcasting Law has been amended several times to allow for renewals of the 
Board of Governors. The latest such amendment took place in 2014 without 
immediately resolving the deadlock over the selection and replacement of its 
members.  
It is quite paradoxical that with so many changes and legal and administrative 
manipulations creating a sense of GPB being in a state of permanent flux, many of 
its employees said in interviews that nothing ever changed at GPB.  
 
                                                 
19 Currently referred to as BBC Editorial Guidelines. 
20 A statement by the EBU consultant, Boris Bergant, at a meeting with GPB management in 
September 2011 attended by the present author. 
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At the time of writing the current paper, the GPB website did not provide an 
organisational chart. The chart available in 2011 showed that almost all power was 
concentrated at the top and rationed in a minimalist fashion to anyone below. It 
provided information on positions within the organisation, but very little about 
who did what in relation to programmes or processes at GPB. It was a static and 
mechanical picture, giving no insight into processes at work, or the nature of 
relationships among constituent parts. Even more worryingly, the chart fully 
reflected the vertical nature of the system, with a few “power” nodes at the top, 
very little in the middle, and a rather unstructured, list-like enumeration of specific 
departments sitting next to one another. The end result was that top management 
ended up trying to micromanage almost all elements of the system. 
The word “Editor” did not appear even once in the chart, while the ever-present 
term “Producer” was overused to the point of being meaningless in reflecting the 
role or job description of a person in question. For example, the job description for 
one senior staff member, the General Producer, was to commission programmes in 
consultation with a few other senior staff members, to oversee their production 
and execution, procurement or acquisition, and later to assess how they worked 
and sat in the schedule. In other words, the job required doing everything from the 
point of view of a programme-making broadcasting organisation. The classical 
division of a sustained programme-making process present in many serious 
broadcast outlets, namely into: 1) designing and commissioning programmes, 2); 
producing and editing actual programmes, and finally 3) editorially controlling 
their impact and effectiveness, was nowhere to be found at GPB.  
The same could be said about the News department, whose head was responsible 
for newsgathering, editorial shape of news and current affairs bulletins and 
programmes, for some running orders, and even for the actual production or 
execution of the flagship 8 o’clock evening news bulletin. There was no clear 
evidence of a typical structured editorial process involving asking and discussing 
essential questions such as what the main stories of the day are, why they are 
important to the public, how best they can be covered, in what order to present 
them, or how to give wider context, or deeper insight to them.  
 
Separateness 
 
Another striking aspect of the organisational structure at GPB is the discrete 
nature of its constituent parts. This time, the division is quite institutionalised and 
has an unwelcome effect on the interaction between channels and departments. 
Most staff – particularly at senior level – consider their units completely separate 
and independent from one another, and often do not perceive themselves as part 
of the same entity, working to the same mission statement and strategy, or 
common goals.  
 
GPB departments regard each other as rival consumers of the budget, and not as 
co-operative business units sharing it. Internal budgetary allocations within the 
organisation are based on a mechanical advance process, which is not based on 
Vol.4No.2Autumn/Winter 2014  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
15 
 
merit or elements of creative competition. There is no mechanism for 
renegotiating or amending budgetary allocations.  
While the organisation perennially complains of the shortage of funds necessary to 
improve its output, it fails to acknowledge an obvious waste of resources caused by 
duplication of effort and infrastructure (see sections below). The source of such 
waste is a mechanical approach consisting in splitting the operations into totally 
separate entities treated by people at the top as their fiefdoms. Occasional efforts 
to compensate for that with fake synergies such as broadcasting TV audio signal on 
radio channels to save a little money on programming can only have an opposite 
effect on the audience: they switch to other channels. 
 
The paradox of PIK 
 
The now defunct First Informational Caucasian Channel, PIK, was redesigned and 
re-launched after its satellite signal had been switched off – arguably for political 
reasons following pressure from Moscow – by a Western provider not long after 
Georgia’s short war with Russia in 2008. It started broadcasting again via a 
different satellite in 2010 on a much grander scale in a remarkably short time with 
a direct injection of several million US dollars from the reserve fund in the 
Georgian government budget. The channel broadcast mostly news and current 
affairs content in a 24 hours format in Russian, and was designed as a 
counterbalancing act to the impact of the Russian media in the region21.  
 
Following the defeat of the Georgian army in August 2008, the region as a whole 
followed the Russian media with renewed attention and vigilance and quite 
possibly more respect. It was clearly a propaganda scoop for the Russians, who had 
used the media to send a powerful signal to the Caucasian nations and ethnic 
groups that their aspiration either for genuine independence or more autonomy 
would meet with resolute countermeasures from Moscow. Coupled with a plethora 
of Russian television channels available widely by satellite or cable across the 
Caucasus and packed with attractively formatted entertainment programmes, the 
Russian media had an unquestionable informational superiority on which to build 
and disseminate their version of the truth. President Saakashvili challenged that 
situation with PIK.  
The official version for injecting several million US dollars into PIK operations at 
the time was that the GPB management had requested a separate allocation from 
the government to boost its external service channel. In retrospect, most observers 
agree that it was President Saakashvili’s initiative after the growing discomfort that 
Georgia had largely failed to win the information war with Russia about the way 
the August 2008 conflict had been perceived in the West. The politics around the 
re-launch of PIK, and the large sums of money involved compared to the GPB 
budget, triggered considerable resentment within GPB. Most GPB staff did not see 
PIK as its integral part.  
 
                                                 
21 For a more detailed report on the re-launch of the channel, see Barry 2011.  
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The fact that PIK’s start-up operation enjoyed ample funding, and was being 
managed by an ostensibly outside commercial company – but in reality by 
executive members of its own staff with a very wide mandate from the presidential 
apparatus – did not help win the hearts and minds of GPB employees, either. The 
differences between generous salary levels at PIK compared to those at the rest of 
GPB added insult to injury, creating a high level of animosity within what was – at 
least on paper – one and the same organisation.  
Within a very short period of time, PIK management and senior staff created what 
looked like an efficient, forward-looking and positively aggressive broadcasting 
operation based on a modern, multimedia platform, with robust provision of news 
and current affairs programmes, and an interactive on-line news component. In 
stark contrast, it underscored the parochial nature and backwardness of the core 
public service broadcaster’s operations. In fact, PIK was the first news-driven TV 
channel operation of its kind in Georgia, with a capacity to broadcast a 24-hour 
news stream, but throughout its short lifetime remained largely unknown to the 
general Georgian public.  
There had never been a single attempt to integrate any of the operations of PIK, or 
its outputs by the rest of GPB. PIK’s offices and studios were based in different 
buildings, rented from another commercial TV channel at relatively high cost, even 
though it would have been quite easy to house them in GPB’s headquarters. There 
was virtually no managerial or editorial interaction between the two entities, let 
alone a common editorial, or newsgathering platform. 
PIK and the 1st Channel’s news and current affairs departments had totally 
separate newsgathering teams and operations, with separate foreign offices and 
separate sets of reporters and correspondents, even though some of them were 
unquestionably bilingual in Georgian and Russian. In an accountable system this 
obvious duplication of effort, staff and resources would have been next to 
impossible to justify before a truly autonomous Board of Trustees, and ultimately 
the Georgian taxpayer.  
Instances of wasteful duplication abound in other areas of GPB as well, particularly 
in news and current affairs. The concept of output sharing and reversioning – a 
pretty universal tool in most multi-channel, and multimedia operations, does not 
exist. New programmatic formats and programme concepts brought in and 
developed at PIK had not been even discussed by core GPB management, and none 
of them had been adopted or transferred into GPB schedules. For example, both 
PIK and the 1st Channel had separate documentary film production units, and 
there was no evidence of any co-operation or sharing of outputs between them. 
PIK also developed quite a robust on-line presence and content provision, 
something almost entirely lacking in the GPB output to this day.  
 
The fearful asymmetry 
 
The 3rd Channel (PIK) was able to perform a complete turn-around within a short 
period of time – about a year – only to be closed a year or so later and leaving very 
little legacy behind. The rest of GPB has taken 10 years to meander through a maze 
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of superficial changes to where it is today. The obvious question would be: why was 
there such an asymmetry between the two entities? And why such stark contrast in 
their performance? It seems that the answer mostly lies in the political 
conditioning around the two entities.  
 
 PIK was re-launched at a time of political expediency after the 2008 war 
enjoying massive government support as a propaganda tool against Russia; 
 It benefited from a hefty injection of start-up funds, free from the budget-
approval limitations imposed on the rest of GPB; 
 Its budget accountability was liberated from standard GPB procedures and 
tied to programming priorities, based on a strategy and specific milestones; 
 Generous salaries offered to production and editorial staff attracted more 
quality individuals, while in-house training closed the skills and competency 
gaps; 
 The management and executive editorial staff enjoyed a high level of 
editorial autonomy and initially a fair degree of respect from the 
government. Consequently, they were able to develop their own editorial 
policy and standards.  
 
Shortly after the parliamentary election in October 2012, and following a strike by 
PIK journalists who in protest at suspended salary payments had broadcast their 
programmes without the sound on, the channel was taken off air. Cable providers 
across Georgia stopped carrying the station’s signal and for a brief period it 
continued to operate as an Internet-only television outlet. After several moves to 
change its ownership and legal status, the channel’s license was revoked and it 
stopped broadcasting permanently. Its several hundred staff lost jobs overnight 
and dispersed across different media organisations and left for other countries 
with virtually none absorbed into other GPB operations – a clear indication how 
separate both entities had been all that time.  
 
There are different theories and interpretations why PIK was taken off air and why 
the closure did not trigger protests within the Georgian civil society.22 In the 
course of its operation, there were strong indications – partly supported by 
whatever statistics were available from the North Caucasus – that as an alternative 
regional provider of news and information PIK was gaining sizeable audiences 
across the region and attracting increasing online traffic less than a year into its 
revamped existence. But many observers say that the interview with the then 
Russian president, Dimitry Medvedev, in August 2011, conducted jointly by PIK, 
Russia Today TV channel and Echo Moskvy, painted President Saakashvili in an 
unfavourable light. There were unofficial reports that he had been infuriated by its 
impact and by what he had seen as ineptitude of PIK presenters to counterbalance 
                                                 
22 For an account of the re-launch of PIK and the politics behind its closure, see Transparency 
International’s report 2013, pp. 8-10.  
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the carefully staged performance by Medvedev.23 The event had apparently started 
the process of disengagement of the presidential administration from the channel 
amid growing but never officially articulated suspicions that PIK was being 
infiltrated by journalists sympathetic to Russia, or opposed to Saakashvili – or 
both. Paradoxically, the man in Georgia behind unsaddling Saakashvili, Bidzina 
Ivanishvili, was among those highly critical of PIK for what they saw as blanket 
anti-Russian coverage. The short-lived operation did not leave any legacy to draw 
on, and GPB management did not make any attempts at any point during its 
operation to exploit what the channel had to offer for the wider organisation. The 
remaining assets of the company managing PIK went over in a rather non-
transparent transaction to a holding headed by a Lithuanian national which some 
observers believe to be a front for a Russian-inspired ploy to permanently erase 
any trace of the short-lived GPB third channel PIK. 
 
 
The Future of GPB as a Broadcaster 
 
Many interviewees for the needs assessment report, including GPB staff members, 
said in private conversations that much of the GPB output was “unwatchable”. 
Many of those made a point of singling out the news and current affairs 
department, Moambe, as better than the rest, but immediately proceeded to 
criticise the content of the news bulletins and talk shows. The rest of the output 
was deemed unworthy even of criticism.  
Some interviewees complained that the potential ability of some news 
programming at GPB to attract a wider audience was killed off by scheduling poor 
quality output just before or after the news. The lack of proper, professionally 
designed and well resourced audience research and figures for particular 
programmes and programming strands, and reliance on anecdotal evidence or 
pure gossip has done GPB a lot of damage. But there is limited understanding 
within the organisation of the importance of knowing audience needs and 
expectations, and little ability of translating such knowledge into captivating 
content. 
 
The 1st Channel’s News and Current Affairs (Moambe) 
 
The output of the news and current affairs department at the 1st Channel is often 
showcased as an example how far GPB has traveled on the way to editorial 
independence, impartiality and balance. But it is examined in isolation from other 
output, while it is important to see how Moambe products impact on other 
programming and channels. However, there is no evidence of cross-fertilisation of 
outputs between departments or channels at GPB.  
Current media market research indicates that GPB’s news and current affairs 
output enjoys a 6-7% audience share, while the rest of the programming stays at 
                                                 
23 This was intimated by PIK editorial staff and presenters themselves in private conversations with 
the present author in Tbilisi in 2011. 
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about 2%. The Moambe department staff has repeatedly stated that they want to 
continue the editorial and journalism training and development initiated by the 
BBC in 2008-2010 in order to make the whole news output of the channel an 
industry standard.  
A short period of monitoring the news output of Moambe conducted for the needs 
assessment manifested many editorial and technical deficiencies, political bias and 
lack of balance in the news bulletins.24 There were strong indications that news 
items directly related to the activities of President Saakashvili had actually been 
produced outside GPB by dedicated crews affiliated to the former administration 
and inserted into the bulletins.25 
 
The 2nd Channel 
 
In 2011, the 2nd channel at GPB broadcast mainly unedited and live parliamentary 
sessions, political briefings, pressers and party political broadcasts. The rest were 
repeats and vacant airtime. With a budget of about 400,000 lari (or less than 
200,000 Euro) per year, and after fixed and operational costs, the channel had 
virtually nothing left to make its own programmes.  
The channel has very limited, or negligible audience. But on the political level, and 
within GPB management, everybody argued that the channel was necessary and 
useful because its purpose was to defuse political tension and appease the 
opposition. The plans to re-launch and develop it as a bona fide parliamentary 
channel similar to BBC Parliament, or the American C-SPAN network have come 
to nothing.  
 
GPB Radio 
 
Only about 4% of GPB’s resources go into radio operations and programming – 
about half of what many public service broadcasters with both TV and radio 
operations invest in the medium. Its Radio 1 on 102.4 FM is a generalist radio 
station. Its mixed format of music and speech-based programming is interspersed 
with hourly news bulletins. The station also produces talk shows, radio drama, 
children’s programmes, and covers sporting events. The station has its own news 
and current affairs unit, which outputs 5 minute illustrated news bulletins on the 
hour from 0600 till 2200. The unit does not share output or co-operate with the 
TV news operations. The news bulletins are fashioned on popular commercial 
formats of reading text against music beds. There was no evidence that the Radio 
news department is involved in any active newsgathering.  
  
Radio 2 on 100.9 FM plays almost exclusively music, and no news. It is hard to see 
any public service remit in the content of Radio 2. There are many music radio 
                                                 
24 The monitoring of Moambe output was conducted by the present author in the week of 5-9 
September 2011. 
25 See Transparency International’s 2013 report p. 9 on co-ordinated news bulletins across TV 
channels under Saakashvili presidency.  
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stations in Georgia, but what distinguishes Radio 2 from other music stations is 
the choice of music.  
Radio appears low on the GPB management’s priority list, but compared to 
television it is a cheap and effective medium, requiring very modest investment to 
achieve pronounced and noticeable results and impact on audience figures. In 
contrast to GPB’s television channels, its radio stations already stand out on 
Georgia’ radio frequencies and can easily become market leaders once their 
schedule and programming are properly calibrated and improved. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
The Georgian public broadcaster is firmly stuck in its current position as a 
marginal player on the broadcast media market and has accepted outside views 
about its role and limitations as its own. In order to break through, GPB needs to 
formulate a clear mission statement, which would be based on audience surveys 
and research, in order to institute a genuine editorial process and forward 
thinking.  
It is clear that GPB’s biggest potential asset is the News and Current Affairs 
component. Investment of extra resources into the development and further 
improvement of that department, and propagation of its projected achievements 
across all GPB channels is the most likely and feasible avenue to follow in an 
attempt to reconnect GBP with wider audiences and win their trust.  
 
Moambe should be seen as a hub or a focal point for radical change in the quality 
of output and editorial integrity. The changes achieved at Moambe would 
strengthen the 1st Channel, enable to revive the future of the two radio channels 
and the ailing 2nd television channel. At the same time, it is necessary to eliminate 
wasteful duplication of effort at GPB. Moambe should become an autonomous unit 
within the GPB structure, and should be split away from the 1st Channel, become 
responsible for all newsgathering, and news output generation for all channels, 
including radio. The new unit would coordinate editorial planning and policies as 
well as all news products, which should be shared and re-versioned according to 
format needs and specificity of a given outlet by dedicated teams. It would work 
towards being seen in the future by the public as the main news provider in 
Georgia. The Georgian public needs to know that whenever they tune in to any 
GPB outlet, there will be quality news and information within their reach.  
 
The simplest and most economical way of reviving the 2nd or “Parliamentary” 
channel would be to make it a news and politics channel, with the inclusion of 
specialist parliamentary coverage and reporting also supplied by Moambe. It could 
broadcast short hourly news bulletins on the hour throughout the day, but also 
carry the main news bulletins of the 1st Channel. It could also rebroadcast a 
number of 1st Channel products at different times, such as talk shows and 
documentaries and include programmes in ethnic minority languages.  
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The overhauled news division should also supply radio news bulletins on the hour 
using general news content generated by the unit. Radio 2, which currently only 
plays music, should broadcast news summaries of 1 or 2 minutes duration on the 
hour. It should also have an on-line news team, and should develop robust online 
content provision drawing on its broadcast output.  
 
The recommendations included in the needs assessment report in 2011 
emphasised the need for extensive, long-term journalism and editorial training 
concentrated on the news division seen as the central part of the organisation. An 
efficient, well managed news division would be in a position to populate schedules 
across television and radio channels and create a credible online presence for GPB 
at a relatively low cost through re-versioning and judicious rebroadcasting. It 
would supply skeletal programming content to all channels which their own teams 
would find easier to populate further with proprietary in-house programming.  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The Georgian public service broadcaster has been unable to develop into an 
autonomous and independent media organisation in spite of all the legal and 
institutional safeguards. It has been a victim of intense political manipulation and 
interference throughout its existence, and most domestic and external 
interventions to improve its position concentrated on changes in legislation and on 
administrative measures, which the political class has always been able to bypass 
or bend to its needs.  
The perennially marginal position of GPB on the Georgian media market also 
appears to be the result of deliberate political action orchestrated by the owners or 
controllers of commercial television channels who do not want to see GPB grow 
into a potential competitor.26 This is a systemic limitation in the Georgian media 
landscape which has been thoroughly politicised and which legal regulations have 
not been able to overcome. The conclusion of the needs assessment conducted in 
2011 was that the best chance for GPB to break through was to develop its internal 
strength. The main instrument for that is professionalisation of its staff and 
management and deep structural reforms – something that even the best media 
laws could not provide, and international organisations have been so far reluctant 
to fund. The present paper fully endorses that position in the context of the 
political changes in Georgia following the elections in 2012 and 2013. 
 
 
                                                 
26 Speaking off the record, most interviewees for the Needs Assessment Report of 2011 said that the rationale 
for both the administration and the owners of main TV channels was more commercial than political – GPB’s 
higher ratings would divert advertising away from the main market players. 
Vol.4No.2Autumn/Winter 2014  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
22 
 
Bibliography 
 
BBC Editorial Guidelines, London, available online 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/editorialguidelines/guidelines/. 
BBC World Service Trust (2008). Georgian Public Broadcasting Training Needs Assessment, 
London. 
Barry, Ellen (2011). Georgians Build Ties with Russian Caucasus. In: New York Times, 12 February 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/02/13/world/europe/13georgia.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
Caucasus Research and Resource Centres (CRRC) (2011). 2009 and 2011 Opinion on Georgian 
Media Frequency Charts. 
Civil Georgia (2014). Public TV Board Reform Stuck in Limbo, Tbilisi 
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=27130. 
Georgian Law on Broadcasting (2004). Available online. 
http://www.gpb.ge/uploads/documents/3a51892c-7e74-423b-a7b4-
d21c335333f1Broadcasting%20Law.pdf. 
Georgian Public Broadcaster (GPB) (2008). GPB’s In-house Code of Conduct, Tbilisi 
http://www.gpb.ge/uploads/documents/bdd67a1a-00c4-46c4-a95c-
d6fa064cf56fGPB_Code_of_Conduct_eng.pdf. 
Georgian Public Broadcaster (2012). Strategy 2011-2015, Tbilisi: 
http://www.gpb.ge/uploads/documents/9425cf40-cb82-46e0-8533-
926d08f18ab0GPB%20STRATEGY%202011-2015.pdf 
Mchedlidze, David (2011). GPB Needs Assessment Reveals Management-related Problem. In: 
Media.ge, 19 October 2011, http://www.media.ge/en/portal/news/42934/.  
Nyman Metcalf, Katrin (2013). Analysis of proposed amendments to the Law of Georgia 'On 
Broadcasting', the OSCE report, Vienna. http://www.osce.org/fom/100314. 
Open Society Foundation (2012). Mapping Digital Media: Georgia, 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/sites/default/files/mapping-digital-media-georgia-
20121023.pdf. 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2010). OSCE, BBC training 
improves professionalism of Azerbaijani public broadcaster, 20 March, 
http://www.osce.org/baku/57688.  
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) (2014). Public Service Broadcasting 
in the Digital Age. Proceedings of the 11th annual South Caucasus Media Conference in 
Tbilisi, http://www.osce.org/fom/126548. 
Transparency International (2009). Television in Georgia – Ownership, Control and Regulation, 
http://transparency.ge/sites/default/files/Media%20Ownership%20November%202009%2
0Eng.pdf 
Transparency International (2013). Crisis Uninterrupted: the story of the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster, http://transparency.ge/en/node/3461.  
Transparency International (2014). Media environment ahead of 2014 Municipal Elections, 
http://transparency.ge/en/post/report/media-ahead-2014-municipal-elections. 
UNDP (2010). Pre-election Media Monitoring in Georgia, 
http://undp.org.ge/files/24_975_639258_MM-CRRC-report-201007.pdf. 
 
 
Marek Bekerman has spent 25 years working in a wide range of jobs in the 
public service broadcasting sector, of which the last 10 was spent in international 
media development. From 1990 till 2011, he worked as a journalist, producer and 
editor for BBC News in London, and since 2004 has travelled extensively in the 
Former Soviet Union countries and the Middle East on media development and 
journalism training assignments. He has provided consultancy services for the 
European Commission, the OSCE, UNDP, Foreign & Commonwealth Office, the 
Vol.4No.2Autumn/Winter 2014  www.globalmediajournal.de 
 
23 
 
Council of Europe, Eurasia Foundation and other agencies. In 2011-12, he 
designed a comprehensive reform programme of the Georgian Public 
Broadcaster for the European Commission, and between 2010 and 2012, he 
coordinated international efforts to reform and modernise Turkmenistan’s media 
legislation and regulation. He was Project Director for the EC-funded media 
development project in Central Asia between 2007 and 2009, and journalism 
education expert for a BBC-led project to modernise media education in Ukraine 
in 2005-2007.  
Email: m.bekerman@salford.ac.uk 
 
